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Reinforcement learning (RL) uses sequential experi-
ence with situations (‘‘states’’) and outcomes to
assess actions. Whereas model-free RL uses this
experience directly, in the form of a reward prediction
error (RPE), model-based RL uses it indirectly,
building a model of the state transition and outcome
structure of the environment, and evaluating actions
by searching this model. A state prediction error
(SPE) plays a central role, reporting discrepancies
between the current model and the observed state
transitions. Using functional magnetic resonance
imaging in humans solving a probabilistic Markov
decision task, we found the neural signature of an
SPE in the intraparietal sulcus and lateral prefrontal
cortex, in addition to the previously well-character-
ized RPE in the ventral striatum. This finding supports
the existence of two unique forms of learning signal
in humans, which may form the basis of distinct
computational strategies for guiding behavior.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most critical divisions in early-20th century animal
learning psychology was that between behaviorist notions
such as Thorndike’s (Thorndike, 1933), that responses are
triggered by stimuli through associations strengthened by rein-
forcement, and Tolman’s proposal (Tolman, 1948), that they
are instead planned using an internal representation of environ-
mental contingencies in the form of a ‘‘cognitive map.’’ Although
the original debate has relaxed into a compromise position, with
evidence at least in rats that both mechanisms exist and adapt
simultaneously (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002), a full character-
ization of their different learning properties and the way that their
outputs are integrated to achieve better control is as yet missing.
Here, we adopt specific computational definitions that havebeen proposed to capture the two different structures of
learning. We use them to seek evidence of the two strategies
in signals measured by functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) in humans learning to solve a probabilistic Markov deci-
sion task.
Theoretical work has considered the two strategies to be
model-free and model-based, and has suggested how their
outputs might be combined depending on their respective
certainties (Daw et al., 2005; Doya et al., 2002). In a model-based
system, a cognitive map or model of the environment is
acquired, which describes how different ‘‘states’’ (or situations)
of the world are connected to each other. Action values for
different paths through this environment can then be computed
by a sort of mental simulation analogous to planning chess
moves: searching forward along future states to evaluate the
rewards available there. This is termed a ‘‘forward’’ or ‘‘tree-
search’’ strategy. In contrast, a model-free learning system
learns action values directly, by trial and error, without building
an explicit model of the environment, and thus retains no explicit
estimate of the probabilities that govern state transitions (Daw
et al., 2005). Because these approaches evaluate actions using
different underlying representations, they produce different
behaviors in experiments aimed at investigating their psycholog-
ical counterparts. Most such experiments (Dickinson and
Balleine, 2002) study whether animals adapt immediately to
changes in the environment. For instance, in classic ‘‘latent
learning’’ studies (Tolman and Honzik, 1930), animals are pre-
trained on a maze, then rewards are introduced at a particular
location to probe whether subjects can plan new routes there
taking into account previously learned knowledge of the maze
layout. The experiment discussed here, though nonspatial,
follows this scheme.
Learning in both model-based and model-free strategies is
typically driven by prediction errors, albeit with different meaning
and properties in each case. A prediction error is a difference
between an actual and an expected outcome and this signal
is commonly thought of as the engine of learning, as it is used
to update expectations in order to make predictions more
accurate.Neuron 66, 585–595, May 27, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 585
Figure 1. Task Design and Experimental
Procedure
(A) The experimental task was a sequential two-
choice Markov decision task in which all decision
states are represented by fractal images. The
task design follows that of a binary decision tree.
Each trial begins in the same state. Subjects can
choose between a left (L) or right (R) button press.
With a certain probability (0.7/0.3) they reach one
of two subsequent states in which they can choose
again between a left or right action. Finally, they
reach one of three outcome states associated
with different monetary rewards (0¢, 10¢, and 25¢).
(B) The experiment proceeded in two fMRI scan-
ning sessions of 80 trials each. In the first session,
subject choices were fixed and presented to them
below the fractal image. However, subjects could
still learn the transition probabilities. Between
scanning sessions subjects were presented with
the reward schedule that maps the outcome states
to the monetary payoffs. This mapping was
rehearsed in a short choice task. Finally, in the
second scanning session, subjects were free to
choose left or right actions in each state. In addi-
tion, they also received the payoffs in the outcome
states.
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Reward and State Prediction Errors in HumansIn the case of model-free learning, this error signal (called the
reward prediction error, RPE) amounts to the difference between
the actual and expected reward at a particular state. In the
context of reinforcement learning (RL), this error signal is used
to learn values for action choices that maximize expected future
reward (Sutton and Barto, 1998). An abundance of evidence
from both single-unit recordings in monkeys (Bayer and
Glimcher, 2005; Schultz, 1998; Schultz et al., 1997) and human
fMRI (D’Ardenne et al., 2008) suggests that dopaminergic
neurons in the ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra pars
compacta exhibit a response pattern consistent with a model-
free appetitive RPE. Furthermore, BOLD signals in the ventral
striatum (vStr) show response properties consistent with dopa-
minergic input (Delgado et al., 2000, 2008; Knutson et al.,
2001, 2005), most notably correlating with RPEs (Haruno and
Kawato, 2006; McClure et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2003).586 Neuron 66, 585–595, May 27, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.Model-based action valuation requires
predicting which state is currently ex-
pected, given previous states and/or
choices. These expectations can be
learned using a different prediction error,
called the state prediction error (SPE),
which measures the surprise in the new
state given the current estimate of the
state-action-state transition probabilities.
The central questions for the current
study are whether the human brain
computes the SPE as well as the RPE,
and, if so, what the different neural signa-
tures of these two signals are. One indi-
cation that the brain may compute SPEs
is that neural signals marking gross viola-tions of expectations have long been reported, particularly using
EEG (Courchesne et al., 1975; Fabiani and Friedman, 1995) and
EEG in combination with fMRI (Opitz et al., 1999; Strobel et al.,
2008). Unlike the prediction error signals associated with dopa-
mine activity, which are largely reward-focused and associated
with model-free RL (Holroyd and Coles, 2002), these respond
to incorrect predictions of affectively neutral stimuli. Here, we
study quantitatively how state predictions are learned, and
seek trial-by-trial neural signals that reflect the dynamics of
this learning.
We designed a probabilistic sequential Markov decision task
involving choices in two successive internal states, followed by
a rewarded outcome state (see Experimental Procedures). The
task has the structure of a decision tree, in which each abstract
decision state is represented by a fractal image (Figure 1A). In
each trial, the participants begin at the same starting state and
Figure 2. Theoretical Model for Data Analysis
We used both a model-free SARSA learner and a model-based FORWARD
learner to fit the behavioral data. SARSA computes an RPE using cached
values from the previous trials to update state-action values. The FORWARD
learner, on the other hand, learns a model of the state space Tðs; a; s0Þby
means of a SPE, which is then used to update the state transition matrix.
Action values are derived by maximizing over the expected value at each state.
In session 2, a HYBRID learner computes a combined action value as an
exponentially weighted sum of the action values for the SARSA and
FORWARD learner. The combined action value is then submitted to softmax
action selection (see Experimental Procedures for details).
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Reward and State Prediction Errors in Humanschoose between a left or right button press. Probabilistically,
they reach one of two subsequent states, each of which presents
another choice between a left or right action. Finally, they reach
one of three probabilistic outcome states providing a reward of
0¢, 10¢, or 25¢.
In order to dissociate SPEs and RPEs, volunteers were first
exposed to just the state space in the absence of any rewards,
much as in a latent learning design. This provides a pure assess-
ment of an SPE. Further, to ensure adequate and equivalent
experience, all choices in the first scanning session were
instructed; subjects only had to register them with the respective
button press (Figure 1B). The instructed choices in session 1
were created so as to reflect the underlying transition probabili-
ties of the decision tree exactly, albeit in a randomized order.
Next, during a break, the subjects were told the reward contin-
gencies and rehearsed the reward mapping with a simple choice
task (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures, available
online). Finally, in the second scanning session, they were able
to make choices on their own to gain rewards at the outcome
states (Figure 1B).
We hypothesized that participants would acquire knowledge
about the transition probabilities during session 1, despite the
absence of any rewarding outcomes. This state knowledgecan therefore be only acquired through model-based learning,
potentially updated via an SPE. Behaviorally, such knowledge
is ‘‘latent’’ during the first session and its presence or absence
can only be revealed subsequently when employed to guide
choices toward reward. However, we sought neural evidence
of state expectation formation during initial training. Specifically,
we expected to see correlates of SPEs, perhaps in the lateral
prefrontal cortex (latPFC), an area which has previously been
suggested to be involved in model-based RL (Samejima and
Doya, 2007). We hypothesized that such signals would be
distinct from neural RPEs, which are often reported in the vStr
(Haruno and Kawato, 2006; McClure et al., 2003; O’Doherty
et al., 2003; Seymour et al., 2004).
RESULTS
Behavioral Assessment of State-Based Learning
We first assessed the participants’ performance at the beginning
of the free-choice session, as a simple test of whether they were
able to make optimal choices by combining the knowledge they
acquired about state transitions and reward contingencies. In
terms of the two learning approaches described above, this
would be possible with model-based, but not model-free,
learning, because the latter focuses exclusively on predicting
rewards without building a model of the environment and there-
fore learns nothing during session 1. If, in accordance with the
model-based theory, the subjects were able to combine their
knowledge of the state space with the reward information pre-
sented prior to session 2, their first choice in session 2 would
be better than chance. Indeed, of all 18 subjects, 13 chose R
(the optimal choice) and 5 chose L in state 1 in the very first trial
of session 2 (p < 0.05, sign-test, one-tailed), indicating that their
choice of behavior cannot be completely explained by traditional
model-free reward learning theory.
Computational Models of Model-Free
and Model-Based Learning
In order to assess the behavioral and neural manifestations of
state and reward learning more precisely, we formalized the
computational approaches described above as trial-by-trial
mathematical models. Based on recent empirical support
(Morris et al., 2006), we used a variant of model-free RL, the
so-called SARSA learner (state-action-reward-state-action) for
implementing value learning via an RPE. By contrast, our
model-based FORWARD learner learned a state transition model
via an SPE (see Figure 2 and Experimental Procedures), and
used this to evaluate actions. In the second session, the mean
correlation of these prediction error signals from both models
was 0.37 (±0.09 SD) across all subjects. (In the first session,
the RPE is 0 throughout, due to the lack of rewards, and only
the SPE is nonzero.) Finally, since previous theoretical proposals
suggest that the brain implements both approaches (Daw et al.,
2005; Doya, 1999; Doya et al., 2002), we implemented aHYBRID
learner that chooses actions by forming a weighted average of
the action valuations from the SARSA and FORWARD learners.
The relative weighting is expected to change over time; indeed,
given suitable prior expectations, there are normative proposals
for determining how (Daw et al., 2005) (see also Behrens et al.,Neuron 66, 585–595, May 27, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 587
Table 1. Behavioral Model Fit
Parameter
Actual
Experiment
Random Trial
Sequence
SARSA learning rate 0.20 0.37 (0.19–0.65)
FORWARD learning rate 0.21 0.29 (0.21–0.44)
Offset for exp. decay 0.63 0.40 (0.20–0.64)
Slope of exp. decay 0.09 0.53 (0.20–0.93)
Inverse softmax
temperature
4.91 3.75 (2.22–4.82)
Lik AIC Lik AIC
SARSA 1217.94 2439.88
FORWARD 1319.75 2643.49
HYBRID 1202.28 2414.56 1256.56 2523.12
Model parameters, negative model likelihoods (Lik), and Akaike’s
Information Criterion (AIC), for the actual experiment and for the permu-
tation analysis with random trial sequences. The latter lists the median
parameter value from 1000 permutation samples and the interquartile
range (25th–75th percentile).
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Reward and State Prediction Errors in Humans2007). Given the singularity of the transition from nonrewarded to
rewarded trials, we built three simple models for the change in
weighting over time, finding that an exponential decay from
FORWARD to SARSA (Camerer and Ho, 1998) (Figure 2) fitted
best (see Table S1, available online).
Evaluating Behavioral Model Fit
These models not only make different predictions about the first
free-choice trial, as examined thus far, but also about how
subjects adjust their choice preferences, trial by trial, in response
to feedback thereafter. In order to test whether either model or
their combination best accounted for these adjustments, we
fitted the free parameters for each model across subjects by
minimizing the negative log-likelihood of the obtained choice
data over the entire free-choice session. The fit parameters,
the resulting model likelihoods, and Akaike’s information criteria
(AIC) are outlined in Table 1 (actual experiment). Thus fit, the
HYBRID learner provided a significantly more accurate explana-
tion of behavior than did SARSA or the FORWARD learner
alone even after accounting for the different numbers of free
parameters (likelihood ratio tests, HYBRID versus SARSA:
c2(2) = 21.32, p = 2.35 3 105; HYBRID versus FORWARD:
c2(2) = 224.94, p = 0). The expected values and estimated state
transition probabilities from all models are visualized in Figure S2
(available online) for the optimal choice trajectory. Finally, we
also computed the probability of correctly predicted choices
by our HYBRID model and a pseudo-R2 measure for each partic-
ipant (Daw et al., 2006) that indicating how much better our
HYBRID learner performs compared to a null model of random
choices for each subject (Table S2).
Further Behavioral Evidence for Model-Based Learning
We conducted an additional analysis to demonstrate in great
detail how behavioral choices are affected by model-based
learning. Although the entirety of all predetermined trials in
session 1 reflected the true transition probabilities exactly, the
specific random sequence of these trials in each participant588 Neuron 66, 585–595, May 27, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.would create different learning trajectories. If participants’ beliefs
about the transition probabilities were updated by error-driven
model-based learning (with a fixed learning rate, as assumed
in FORWARD), this may have left a bias toward the most recently
experienced transitions, resulting in particular beliefs at the end
of the session. These particular beliefs could in turn lead to
subject-specific choice trajectories as session 2 progressed,
which would be reflected in the fit of the model to those choices.
Conversely, if the subjects did not learn anything about the tran-
sition probabilities from their particular transitions using an SPE
(with a fixed learning rate), then we would not expect any influ-
ence of their particular sequence of trials in session 1 on their
choices in session 2. Thus, in the case of no model-based
learning in session 1, any sequence of trials (including the
actually experienced sequence) should lead to the same quality
of model fit to the choices, whereas in the case of state learning
with the FORWARD model, we would expect a better model fit
under the actual trial sequence compared to any other random
sequence.
We tested this by refitting the model 1000 times using
randomly permuted session 1 trial sequences and randomly
permuted intermediate states (See Supplemental Experimental
Procedures for details), and compared the model fit for the
session 2 choices against the fit based on the actual trial
sequence. The results of this additional analysis are presented
in Table 1 (random trial sequence) and confirm that our partici-
pants had indeed acquired knowledge about the particular
sequence of state transitions during the first session: 99.6% of
permutation samples provided a poorer explanation of choices
than the original (p = 0.004).
In conclusion, the behavioral results indicate (1) that the
participants successfully acquired knowledge about the state
transition probabilities in session 1 through a model-based
FORWARD learner and (2) that the participants’ behavior reflects
both model-based and model-free learning processes. This
invites a search for their neural manifestations in terms of SPEs
and RPEs.
Neural Signatures of RPE and SPE
We sought neural correlates of the prediction errors from both
models. For this, we derived an RPE from the SARSA learner
for session 2 and an SPE from the FORWARD learner for
both sessions and included them as parametric modulators at
the second decision state and the final outcome state in the
single-subject analyses (see Experimental Procedures). The
voxel-wise parameter estimate (beta) for these regressors indi-
cates how strongly a particular brain area covaries with these
model-derived prediction errors. These beta images were
included in a repeated-measures ANOVA at the second level
testing for the effect of each error signal across the group (see
Experimental Procedures).
In order to determine those brain areas that covaried with the
SPE, we pooled across both sessions and found significant
effects bilaterally in the posterior intraparietal sulcus (pIPS)
reaching on the left side into the superior parietal lobule and on
the right side into the angular gyrus, and in the lateral prefrontal
cortex (latPFC) (dorsal bank of the posterior inferior frontal gyrus
[pIFG], see circled areas in Figures 3A and 3B and Table 2). Other
Figure 3. Neural Representations of State
Prediction Errors and Reward Prediction
Errors
The SPE is pooled across both scanning sessions,
whereas the RPE is only available in the rewarded
session 2. BOLD activation plots on the right are
the average percent signal change (across
subjects, error bars = SEM) for those trials in which
the prediction error (PE) is low, medium, or high
(33rd, 66th, and 100th percentile PE range). Data
are extracted using a cross-validation procedure
(leave-one-out) from the nearest local maximum
from the coordinates listed in the Table 2 (circled
areas, see Experimental Procedures for details).
Red = SPE, green = RPE. (A and B) Significant
effect for SPE bilaterally in the intraparietal sulcus
(ips) and lateral prefrontal cortex (lpfc). (C) Signifi-
cant effects for RPE in the ventral striatum (vstr).
Color codes in the SPMs correspond to p <
0.001 and p < 0.0001 uncorrected.
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meet our statistical threshold for whole-brain correction and
are not further discussed. The graphs show the average percent
signal change (PSC) in BOLD activation across subjects for both
prediction error signals on trials in which that error signal was
low, medium, or high (bins defined at 33rd, 66th, and 100th
percentile, see Experimental Procedures for details). This reveals
a linear increase in BOLD activation across trials with increasing
SPEs, except for the left IPS, in which the increase in BOLD
activation occurs only for trials with the highest SPE. In contrast,
there is no such systematic relationship between BOLD activa-
tion and the RPE.
Conversely, when we tested for a correlation between BOLD
activation and the RPE, we found a significant effect in the vStr
(Figure 3C), consistent with previous accounts (McClure et al.,
2003; O’Doherty et al., 2003), but no effects for an SPE even at
p < 0.001 uncorrected. The graph of the average PSC across
subjects in this region shows the opposite pattern from that in
the pIPS and latPFC: a linear increase in BOLD activity across
trials with increasing RPE, but no such increase for the SPE.
In a follow-up analysis, to investigate the consistency of SPE
results between the sessions, we identified the peak voxels forNeuron 66, 585–the SPE signal in session 2 only, and
then tested for a significant SPE re-
presentation in session 1 in a reduced
spherical search volume (radius: 10 mm,
p < 0.05, family-wise error [FWE] correc-
tion for search volume). This procedure
ensures that the centers for the search
volumes are selected in a way that is
independent of the data in session 1.
We found significant effects of SPE in
session 1 bilaterally in latPFC and in the
right pIPS/angular gyrus (Figure 4), con-
firming that these areas correlate with
an SPE even in the absence of any reward
information (see Table 2). To test foroverlapping voxels with SPE representations in both sessions,
we employed a conjunction analysis (Nichols et al., 2005) and
found evidence that voxels in these regions were activated in
both sessions at p < 0.001 uncorrected.
Relationship between Neural SPE Signal and Behavior
We next considered whether this neural correlate of an SPE is
also behaviorally relevant for making better choices at the begin-
ning of the free-choice session. To address this question, we
correlated in each participant the parameter estimate for the
SPE in those regions possessing a significant SPE representa-
tion in session 1 (bilateral latPFC and right pIPS, extracted and
averaged from a 10 mm spherical volume centered on the group
peak voxel) with the percent correct choices. The latter is
a behavioral measure defined as the choice of the action with
the highest expected value (reward magnitude 3 true transition
probability) (see Figure S1), and is independent of the computa-
tional models employed for the imaging analysis. We observed
a significant correlation between the neural and the behavioral
data of r = 0.57 (p = 0.013) in the right pIPS, but not in latPFC
(left: r = 0.28, p = 0.27; right; r = 0.38, p = 0.12). This suggests
that the degree to which pIPS encodes an SPE representation595, May 27, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 589
Table 2. Statistical Results
Contrast Region Hemi BA x y z Z p
Average SPE in both sessions post IPS/SPL L 7 27 54 45 5.29 0.004
post IPS/angular gyrus R 40 39 54 39 5.12 0.009
latPFC (dorsal pIFG) L 44 45 9 33 5.62 <0.001
latPFC (dorsal pIFG) R 44 45 12 30 4.73 0.049
Reward prediction error in session 2 ventral striatum L 25 12 6 9 5.18 0.006
SPE signals in session 1 (within sphere [10 mm radius]
based on SPE signals in session 2)
post IPS L 7 n.s.
post IPS/angular gyrus R 40 36 66 39 3.68 0.01*
latPFC (dorsal pIFG) L 44 39 9 33 4.49 0.001*
latPFC (dorsal pIFG) R 44 48 9 36 3.20 0.039*
48 45 15 30 3.12 0.049*
Conjunction between SPE signals from both sessions latPFC (dorsal pIFG) L 44 39 9 33 4.49 <0.001**
latPFC (dorsal pIFG) R 44 48 9 36 3.20 0.001**
post IPS/angular gyrus R 40 33 66 39 3.75 <0.001**
post IPS/angular gyrus R 40 39 54 39 3.31 <0.001**
SPE in both session > unsigned reward prediction
error [abs(RPE)]
Post IPS/angular gyrus R 40 36 66 39 5.49 <0.001
All peaks are corrected for the entire brain volume at p < 0.05 unless stated otherwise. (*), corrected for 10 mm spherical search volume centered on the
peak of the SPE contrast in session 2. (**), uncorrected threshold of p < 0.001. IPS, intraparietal sulcus; SPL, superior parietal lobule; latPFC, lateral
prefrontal cortex; pIFG, posterior inferior frontal gyrus; BA, Brodmann Area.
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subjects deploy a forward model in guiding their choices at the
beginning of session 2 (see Figure 5).
Differentiating the SPE Signal from Nonspecific
Attention or Salience
A possible explanation for the SPE signal is that it merely reflects
a general attentional or salience signal, with subjects deploying
greater attention on trials in which a given state was more unex-
pected, compared to those in which it was less unexpected.
However, we might expect that attention would be grabbed
equally by the delivery of unexpected rewards or omissions of
reward, and certainly more by either of these than the unex-
pected presentations of the somewhat less behaviorally salient
visual stimuli, which denote the different states in our task.
Thus, we tested the null hypothesis that the areas identified as
correlating with an SPE could be also explained by an unspecific
surprise signal by examining the correlations between our fMRI
data and the absolute value of our signed RPE signal [abs(RPE)],
which exactly captures the unexpectedness of the delivery or
omission of reward. This abs(RPE) signal correlated with a
number of brain regions including an IPS locus anterior to where
we found SPE correlates at p < 0.001 uncorrected (Figure S3).
However, a direct comparison between SPE and abs(RPE) re-
vealed a region of both posterior IPS that was significantly better
explained by the SPE than by the abs(RPE) signal at p < 0.05
corrected, as well as a region of latPFC that showed a difference
at p < 0.001 uncorrected (Figure S4). We also tested whether the
conjunction of SPE and abs(RPE) showed a significant effect in
our target region, in order to assess whether these signals
were even partially overlapping. No voxel survived the conjunc-
tion contrast, even at an uncorrected threshold. Taken together,590 Neuron 66, 585–595, May 27, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.these findings suggest that the SPE signal we observe in parietal
cortex and latPFC is unlikely to reflect a nonspecific arousal or
attentional signal.
DISCUSSION
We used a probabilistic Markov decision task to investigate the
neural signatures of RPEs and SPEs associated with model-free
and model-based learning. Our behavioral analysis demon-
strated that participants successfully acquired knowledge about
the state transition probabilities in the first nonrewarded session,
in which only the model-based system could usefully learn. They
were able to use that knowledge to make better choices at the
beginning of the second, free-choice, session. Subsequent
choices were most consistent with a hybrid account, combining
model-based and model-free influences. However, we found
that the supremacy of the model-based learner in the HYBRID
declined rapidly over the course of continuing learning. In the
imaging data we found trial-by-trial correlations of the model-
based SPE in the pIPS and latPFC, whereas a model-free RPE
correlated with the BOLD signal in the vStr. The fMRI data,
together with the computational modeling, therefore allowed
us to assess a trial-by-trial parametric signal of latent expecta-
tion formation during the training phase, even though its
behavioral consequences on choice are only observable in the
rewarded phase of the task.
Our findings of neural correlates of our SPE signal in latPFC
may relate to studies of human causal learning, which report
activity in the region while subjects learn causal relationships
between cues and consequences (Fletcher et al., 2001). Predic-
tion errors have been proposed as a putative mechanism for
guiding learning of such causal associations (Dickinson, 2001),
Figure 4. Neural Representations of the
State Prediction Error in pIPS and latPFC
Separately for Both Sessions
Data are extracted in the same way as in Figure 3
and plotted according to low, medium, or high
SPE (error bars = SEM across subjects, see
Experimental Procedures for details). Color codes
in the SPMs correspond to p < 0.001 and p <
0.0001 uncorrected.
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how such a putative causal learning error signal is implemented
in the brain has not yet been specified (Fletcher et al., 2001), and
previous imaging studies have not examined its trial-by-trial
computational dynamics. Furthermore, recent recording studies
in monkeys have associated neuronal activity in this area with
sequential planning behavior (Mushiake et al., 2006) and with
the monkey’s performance during dynamic competitive games
(Barraclough et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2004). On these grounds
the latPFC has been proposed to contribute toward the imple-
mentation of model-based RL, possibly in the form of Bayesian
belief states (Samejima and Doya, 2007), an account consistent
with our proposed role of this area in model-based RL. The
present results, when taken together with these previous find-
ings, could suggest a very general role for latPFC in learning
probabilistic stimulus-stimulus associations.
The finding that BOLD activity in pIPS correlates with an SPE
may be interpreted in the context of previous neurophysiological
studies into the activity of neurons in the lateral intraparietal area
(LIP) during saccadic decision-making. Putative pyramidal cells
report expectations about as-yet unknown characteristics aboutNeuron 66, 585–5the state of the world (Gold and Shadlen,
2002), possibly coded in terms of the
expected values of saccades (Platt and
Glimcher, 1999; Sugrue et al., 2004).
Other subregions of posterior parietal
cortex (PPC) appear to be specialized
for different movement modalities (Cui
and Andersen, 2007), though less is
known about their behavior with respect
to decision variables. Under the view
that the fMRI BOLD signal reflects in
part the input into an area and intrinsic
computations within it (Logothetis et al.,
2001), it is straightforward to envision
the SPE input that we recorded as beingnecessary for learning the structure of the environment neces-
sary to support these predictions. The finding that SPE signals
are present in pIPS while subjects are learning state transitions,
even in the complete absence of reward (session 1 of our task),
suggests that this region is involved also in pure state-learning,
and not just in encoding value-based representations. Further-
more, it is interesting to note that SPE signal in right pIPS is
predictive of subsequent successful choice behavior, whereas
the same signal in the left latPFC is not. This underlines the
importance of the state space representation that is built in the
parietal cortex, and suggests that the latPFC, despite maintain-
ing a similar representation of the SPE, may be concerned with
integrating other learning signals too, and therefore does not
exhibit the same clear link to subsequent choice behavior.
Unexpected events are often considered as leading to the
deployment of attention, in the form of orienting or executive
control. Further, the areas correlated with the SPE signal are
thought to be involved in aspects of attention (the PPC with
orienting/salience [Yantis et al., 2002] and frontal regions with
executive control [Corbetta et al., 2000; MacDonald et al.,
2000]). Thus, it is natural to question whether this correlation isFigure 5. Relationship between Neural
Representation of an SPE and Choice
Behavior
The y axis represents a measure for the strength of
the relationship between BOLD activity and the
SPE. The x axis shows a measure of correct
performance. A ‘‘correct choice’’ was defined as
the choice of the action with the highest optimal
Q value in a particular state (see Figure S4 for
details on the optimal Q values). Error bars =
SEM across subjects.
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mental design does not allow us to rule this out definitively; and
indeed some models of associative learning use a signal akin to
our SPE to control the assignment of salience for learning to
particular stimuli (Pearce and Hall, 1980), according to some
accounts via a cholinergic pathway associated with the PPC
(Bucci et al., 1998). In this context, the model-based approach
used here would provide a computational account of the means
by which such attention is allocated on a trial-by-trial basis, and of
how those allocations change as a function of learning and expe-
rience. Our findings would then be novel evidence about the
mechanisms underlying this form of learning. However, the
appeal of this and other accounts that depend on salience is
weakened by the observation that the SPE is only a possibly
minor but very specific subcomponent of a general surprise
signal, which we would expect to be dominated by reward-
induced salience signals: unexpected delivery or omission of
reward at the end of a trial. Our finding that our model-based
SPE provided a significantly better account for the BOLD signal
in pIPS and latPFC than an unsigned RPE (Figure S4) provides
direct evidence for the distinction between these two signals.
Similarly, we observed that the correlation with the SPE is
present in the first session. The subjects’ choices were in-
structed during this session, which likely requires less engage-
ment of executive control processes compared to the free-
choice decisions in the second session. Therefore, it seems
unlikely that executive control is the sole reason for driving the
correlation between frontal regions and the SPE.
More recently, neuronal correlates of perceptual learning have
also been associated with data recorded from the PPC (Law and
Gold, 2008). Because our stimuli (fractal images, see Figure 1)
were selected for maximal discriminability in terms of color
scheme and shape, low-level perceptual learning resulting in
altered activation due to improvement in stimulus detection
and discriminability was most likely minimized in our study and
cannot account for the SPE signal found in pIPS. However,
perceptual learning—in the sense of subtly changed perceptual
representations due to reinforcement (Seitz and Dinse, 2007)—
may of course be engaged during the task, especially in session
2, although due to the absence of reinforcement in session 1, this
explanation is unlikely to account for the state-learning signals
observed throughout session 1 and 2.
In addition to the SPE signals we observed in pIPS and latPFC,
we also found evidence of RPE signals in the vStr. This is consis-
tent with many previous accounts (McClure et al., 2003;
O’Doherty et al., 2003; Seymour et al., 2004). Our findings
suggest that the two different types of learning signal are at least
partly anatomically dissociable in the brain. Whereas the RPE is
present predominantly in subcortical structures such as the
striatum, appropriate to the rich input into this area from mid-
brain dopaminergic neurons (Haber, 2003) known to broadcast
this signal (Schultz, 1998; Schultz et al., 1997), the SPE was
present instead in dorsal cortical areas, in the parietal and frontal
lobes. The distinct neuroanatomical footprints of these signals
could reflect the suggestion that they are being used to learn
representations in two separate but interacting systems involved
in behavioral control: a model-based (goal-directed) system that
may involve a number of cortical areas in addition to parts of592 Neuron 66, 585–595, May 27, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.anterior medial striatum, and a model-free (habitual) system
that may depend predominantly on dopaminergic-striatal path-
ways (Balleine et al., 2007). However, the data presented here,
in particular the weighted combination of both models in the
hybrid account, suggests that both learning mechanisms act
together to produce effective action selection rather than dual-
istic processing of two learning modules that exert separate
control over choice behavior.
In conclusion, there is an impressive agreement from a wide
variety of animal and human paradigms for the involvement of
at least two systems in decision-making and control. The simpler
of these two, associated with habits and model-free RL, has
attracted a huge wealth of work, and there are ample studies
(also confirmed here) elucidating its basic learning mechanisms
driven by an RPE. By comparison, the more sophisticated,
model-based system, with its rich adaptability and flexibility,
has been more sparsely studied. Here, we have pinned down
what is perhaps the most critical and basic signal for this system,
namely the SPE. In particular, we showed that the two error
signals are computed in partially distinct brain areas and illus-
trated how human choice behavior may emerge through the
combination of the systems.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants
Twenty subjects were tested on the experimental paradigm. All subjects were
recruited from the Caltech student population, were free of any neurological or
psychiatric diseases, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Informed
consent was obtained from every subject and the study was approved by the
Caltech Institutional Review Board.
Two subjects were excluded because they did not meet our criterion for
minimal learning during the experiment: we compared the total amount of
monetary rewards that the subjects obtained at the end of the experiment
against a Monte-Carlo simulation of 10,000 randomly behaving agents and
determined the upper 95th percentile of this distribution. Two subjects, whose
outcome was not greater that this threshold, were excluded from the analyses.
The remaining 18 subjects (8 females) had a mean age of 24 years (±7.57 SD).
Experimental Task
We designed a Markov decision task in which the subjects had to make two
sequential choices (‘‘LEFT’’ or ‘‘RIGHT’’), one in each of two successive
decision states in order to obtain a monetary outcome at the end state.
Each state was signaled to the subject by a different fractal image (see Fig-
ure 1A for an example), which indicated to them that during the first two states
they had the choice between left or right button press. The states were inter-
sected by a variable temporal interval drawn from a randomly uniform distribu-
tion between 3 and 5 s. The intertrial interval was also sampled randomly from
a uniform distribution between 5 and 7 s. Upon each state the subjects had 1 s
to make the button press. If they failed to submit their choice in that time
window the trials restarted from the beginning.
The layout of the state transitions followed that of a binary tree (see Fig-
ure 1A). The first state was always the same. Following the first left/right choice
subjects transitioned into one of two different intermediate states with different
state transition probabilities. Following the second left/right choice they tran-
sitioned into one of three different outcome states associated with different
amount of monetary wins (0¢, 10¢, or 25¢) which were rescaled to 0, 0.4,
and 1 for all behavioral modeling. The assignment of fractal images to states
was randomized across subjects.
The experiment proceeded in two separate scanning sessions of 80 trials
each. During the first session, all decisions were predetermined and the
subjects simply had to register them. Subjects also received no rewards at
the outcome states during this part of the experiment (see Figure 1B). Taken
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probabilities exactly, but they were presented in a randomized order. Subse-
quently, during a break, subjects were exposed to the reward contingencies
(see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). Finally, in the second scanning
session, subjects made their own choices and were rewarded at the outcome
states.
Data Acquisition
Functional imaging was performed on a 3T Siemens (Erlangen, Germany)
Trio scanner. Forty-five contiguous interleaved axial slices of echo planar
T2*-weighted images were acquired in each volume with a slice thickness of
3 mm and no gap (repetition time 2730 ms, echo time 30 ms, flip angle 80, field
of view 192 mm2, matrix size 64 3 64). Slice orientation was tilted 30 from
the line connecting the anterior and posterior commissure to alleviate signal
drop out in the orbitofrontal cortex (Deichmann et al., 2003). We discarded
the first four volumes to compensate for T1 saturation effects.
Image Processing
Image processing and statistical analyses were performed using SPM5
(available at http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). All volumes from all sessions
were corrected for differences in slice acquisition, realigned to the first volume,
spatially normalized to a standard echo planar imaging template included in
the SPM software package (Friston et al., 1995) using fourth-degree B-spline
interpolation, and finally smoothed with an isotropic 8 mm FWHM Gaussian
filter to account for anatomical differences between subjects and to allow
for valid statistical inference at the group level. Images contaminated by
movement artifacts were identified using a velocity cutoff of 0.2 mm/TR.
Furthermore, unphysiological global signal changes were identified using
a cutoff for the global image mean of ± 2.5 SD above or below the session-
specific mean. Nuisance regressors were created for these scans (with a single
1 for the questionable scan and 0 s elsewhere) to be included as covariates of
no interest in the first-level design matrices.
Computational Learning Models
We implemented three learning models, which hypothesize different methods
by which participants might use experience with states, actions, and rewards
to learn choice preferences.
SARSA Learner
We derive an RPE by using a model-free SARSA learner, a variant of classic RL
(Sutton and Barto, 1998) (see also Figure 2). The name refers to the experience
tuple <s; a; r; s0; a0>, where s and s0 refer to the current and next state, a and
a0 to the current and next action, and r represents the obtained rewards. The
learner attempts to estimate a ‘‘state-action value’’ QSARSAðs; aÞ for each state
and action. These values are initialized to 0 at the start of the experiment, and
then at each step of the task the value of the state and action actually experi-
enced,QSARSAðs; aÞ, is updated in light of the reward obtained in the next state,
rðs0Þ and the estimated value QSARSAðs0; a0Þ of the next state and action. In
particular, an RPE dRPE is computed as:
dRPE = rðs0Þ+gQSARSAðs0; a0Þ QSARSAðs; aÞ
where g is the temporal discount factor, which we fixed to g= 1 because the
two-step task does not allow subjects to choose between rewards at different
delays.
The RPE is used to update the state-action value as:
QSARSAðs; aÞ=QSARSAðs; aÞ+adRPE
where a is a free parameter controlling the SARSA learning rate.
FORWARD Learner
We used a dynamic programming approach to implement a FORWARD
learner, which utilizes experience with state transitions to update an estimated
state transition matrix Tðs; a; s0Þof transition probabilities. Each element of
Tðs; a; s0Þ therefore holds the current estimate of the probability of transitioning
from state s to s0 given action a. These transitions are initialized to uniform
distributions connecting each state and action to those on the next level ofthe tree. Upon each step, leaving state s and arriving in state s0, having taken
action a, the FORWARD learner computes an SPE:
dSPE = 1  Tðs; a; s0Þ
and updates the probability Tðs; a; s0Þof the observed transition via:
Tðs; a; s0Þ=Tðs; a; s0Þ+ hdSPE
where h is a free parameter controlling the FORWARD learning rate. The esti-
mated probabilities for all states not arrived in (i.e., for all states s00 other than s0 )
are reduced according to Tðs; a; s00Þ=Tðs; a; s00Þ$ð1  hÞ, to ensure that the
distribution remains normalized.
Estimated transition probabilities are used together with the rewards at
the end states, r(s) (which were taken as given since the participants were
instructed in them), to compute the state-action valueQFWD as the expectation
over the value of the successor state. This is done by dynamic programming,
i.e., recursively evaluating the Bellman equation defining the state-action
values at each level in terms of those at the next level. Here, QFWDðs; aÞ=0
for the terminal reward states at the bottom of the tree, and for the other states:
QFWDðs; aÞ=
X
s 0
Tðs; a; s0Þ3 ðrðs0Þ+ arg max
a 0
QFWDðs0; a0ÞÞ:
HYBRID Learner
We considered a third, HYBRID learner, which combines state-action value
estimates from both SARSA and FORWARD learners into a single set of value
estimates. The model assumes that the two sets of state-action value esti-
mates are combined according to a weighted average. We assume that the
relative weight accorded to the two functions in determining the hybrid
state-action valuations (and thus choice behavior) can change over the course
of the free-choice scanning session (session 2). Following Camerer and Ho
(1998), we characterize the form of this change with an exponential function:
wt = l3 e
kt
where wt is the trial-specific weight term for trial number t, and l and k are two
free parameters describing the form of the exponential decay (l: offset, k:
slope).
Q values for the HYBRID learner are then computed as a weighted sum of
the estimates from the two other learners, on trial t:
QHYBðs; aÞ=wt 3QFWDðs; aÞ+ ð1 wtÞ3QSARSAðs; aÞ:
Action Selection
Each of the models additionally assumes that participants select actions
stochastically according to probabilities determined by their state-action
values through a softmax distribution:
Pðs; aÞ= expðt3Qðs; aÞÞPn
b=1expðt3Qðs;bÞÞ
where Q is QSARSA, QFWD, or QHYB, depending on the model, and the free
‘‘inverse temperature’’ parameter t controls how focused the choices are on
the highest valued action.
We fit each model’s free parameters to the behavioral data by minimizing the
negative log-likelihood P logðPðs; aÞÞ of the obtained choices a given the
previously observed choices and rewards, summed over all subjects and trials.
The HYBRID learner has five free model parameters (a, h, t, l, and k); the
SARSA and FORWARD learners each have 2 (a or h, and t). We estimated
a single set of parameters for all participants because the unregularized
maximum likelihood estimators tend to be very noisy in individual subjects,
leading to very different and sometimes even outlying parameter estimates.
In addition, the resulting regressors for this kind of ‘‘model-based fMRI’’
data analysis tend to perform poorly. A single set of parameters, as frequently
employed in our recent work (Daw et al., 2006; Gershman et al., 2009; Gla¨scher
et al., 2009) imposes a simple but efficient regularization that stabilizes the esti-
mated model parameters. Goodness of fit was compared between models,
taking into account the different numbers of free parameters using likelihood
ratio tests and AIC.Neuron 66, 585–595, May 27, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 593
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The analysis of the functional imaging commenced with single-subject anal-
yses. We created subject-specific design matrices containing the following
regressors: (1) three regressors encoding the average BOLD response at
each of the three states (two choice states, one outcome state); (2) two regres-
sors encoding the model-derived prediction error signals (RPE and SPE)
modeled at the time of state 2 and the outcome; (3) two regressors of
model-derived value signals modeled at the time of state 1 and state 2 (not
further analyzed in this paper); (4) a nuisance partition containing regressors
modeling the individual scans that were identified as contaminated by
movement and unphysiological global signal change (see Image Processing
subsection above); and (5) a nuisance partition containing six regressors
that encoded the movement displacement as estimated from the affine part
of the image realignment procedure. Because subjects did not receive any
reward information in session 1, we only included the SPE signal; all other
model-derived variables were 0 throughout the entire session 1 because of
the lack of reward information. Both error signals were entered unorthgonal-
ized into the first-level design matrices.
These subject-specific design matrices were estimated and three beta
images for the prediction error signals (SPE from both sessions, RPE from
session 2) were entered into a repeated-measures ANOVA with factors error
(RPE, SPE) and session (sess1, sess2) correcting for nonspherical distribution
of the error term to test for a significant effect across the entire group.
We set our statistical threshold to p < 0.05 FWE corrected for the entire
brain volume. The areas surviving these corrected thresholds are listed in
Table 2 and are discussed in the main paper. However, for display purposes
we show the statistical maps with the significant correlation with both predic-
tion errors at p < 0.001 and p < 0.0001.
For the analysis about the consistency of SPE signal in pIPS and latPFC, we
insure independence of voxel selection by first identifying the cluster peaks in
these regions for the SPE signal in the rewarded session 2. We then defined
a spherical search volume (radius: 10 mm) around these peaks and identified
significant correlations (p < 0.05, FWE for the reduced search volume) between
the SPE and the BOLD signal in the independent session 1. For a formal statis-
tical test of identical voxels in session 1 and 2 that exhibit the correlation with
the SPE signal, we also employed a conjunction analysis (Nichols et al., 2005)
at an uncorrected statistical threshold of p < 0.001.
Plots of the data were created using the rfxplot toolbox for SPM5 (Gla¨scher,
2009), which is capable of dividing a parametric modulator into different bins
and estimating the average BOLD response for each bin. We extracted
the data for the plots of PSC in Figures 3 and 4 using a cross-validation
leave-one-out procedure: we re-estimated our second-level analysis
(repeated-measures ANOVA, see above) 18 times, always leaving out one
subject. Starting at the peak voxels for the SPE signal in IPS and PFC and
for the RPE in vStr, we selected the nearest maximum in these cross-validation
second-level analyses. From that new voxel we extracted the data from the
left-out subject and sorted all trials into three bins according to the size of
the SPE, and defined by the 33rd, 66th, and 100th percentile of the SPE range.
Then three new onset regressors containing all trials of each bin were created
and estimated for each left-out subject. The parameter estimates of these
onset regressors represent the average height of the BOLD response for all
trials in each bin. The data plots in Figures 3 and 4 are the average (across
all left-out subjects in the cross-validation analyses) parameter estimates
(betas) converted to PSC for these three regressors.SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information for this article includes four figures, two tables, and
Supplemental Experimental Procedures and can be found with this article
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